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19602 in England, an outgrowth of the Nathan Committee Report, a
was directed at involving a central governmental agency in increasing the effectiveness of charitable endeavors. Although it is too
early to evaluate the impact of the legislation, the experience of both
England and Canada should be useful to the federal and state governments of this country as the inevitable trend toward closer supervision and scrutiny continues.
Government, at both the state and national levels, now provides increased welfare assistance in a greater variety of forms than
ever before. As a result we are experiencing a new political and
social phenomenon in which government and private charity sometimes complement, sometimes duplicate, one another in similar
charitable activities. The resources involved in these activities in
these times are massive. Moreover, the opportunities for abuse in
solicitation, in operation, in acquiring improperly tax benefits and
other subventions at the state and national level make demonstrably
clear the importance of institutional mechanisms for proper protection of the public and for the effective fulfillment of the charitable
purpose. 4 The need, therefore, for a proper ordering of: these
important functions in a complex society becomes ever more pressing. Mrs. Fremont-Smith's final'chapter: "Prospects and Retommendations" is well worth thoughtful examination and reflection as 'one
considers the problems:raised in this most difficult area.
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MR. JUSTICE MURPHY AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS.

It is my unhappy duty to report that this is a disappointing book.
The difficulty is not that the subject is unsuited for book-length
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treatment. Justice Murphy was one of the modern Supreme Court's
more colorful chaacters; and though controversial, because he perceived of civil liberties problems less as a lawyer than as a moralist,
so many of his libertarian protests have been vindicated by subsequent decisions that a reappraisal of his civil liberties contributions is certainly in order. This is the first book to appear concerning
Justice Murphy's judicial career. Unfortunately, it fails its subject,
both conceptually and in execution.
The central flaw is an unclear focus. In format, the book is an
edited volume containing over seventy opinions by the Justice, a
few of his speeches, excerpts from commentaries, and introductory
essays by the author which are designed to link these materials to
current issues. The author's purpose is frankly polemical. "Justice
Murphy's opinions taken together constitute a tract of our times,"
he asserts.1 By reprinting them, he hopes to enlist the "moral passion and intellectual fervor of Justice Murphy's defense of civil
liberties" in the cause of citizenship education of lawyers and laymen, and to accord Murphy himself "a degree of recognition more
proportioned to his contribution .... "2 There is insight here, because
Justice Murphy was a gifted evangelist. He entered the high court
calling it a "Great Pulpit"; and his best known opinions, such as
his dissents in Korematsu v. United States3 and In re Yamashita,4
stung the moral conscience of contemporaries. Nevertheless, the
results are mixed. Nowhere does the author attempt to "flesh out"
Murphy as a person or his credentials for such a role. Nowhere does
he analyze the actual influence of Murphy's opinions on current
libertarian judges or whether the similarity of view is only incidental. Nowhere is there a critical evaluation of his work, beyond
excerpts from commentaries by Thurgood Marshall, Archibald Cox,
and others, which were written shortly after his death in 1949.
Opinions, in the main, are left to speak for themselves.
This method works well enough in subjects such as criminal
procedure and equal protection in which the Justice was assigned a
sufficient number of cases or wrote sufficient dissents to elaborate a
complete position. The method works less well in subjects such as
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the first amendment, in which Murphy wrote peripherally or not
at all. Since opposing opinions are not included, the reader must
depend on the introductory essays for orientation; and gaps inevitably result.
The most frustrating of these gaps concerns church-state relations. Frank Murphy was not only the first Roman Catholic whose
appointment to the Supreme Court rested explicitly on religious
criteria; he was the Court's most experienced member in dealing
with the problem, the first Catholic Justice to interpret the establishment clause directly, a devout Catholic who advanced a pragmatic Jeffersonianism toward the difficult issues of public policy
raised, the swing-man in Everson v. Board of Education, and a
judge who felt so deeply about the McCollumc decision that he organized clerical rebuttals to the intemperate criticism of a Roman
Catholic Cardinal.7 The author could have enlightened us about
these matters had he drawn upon the Justice's papers at the University of Michigan. Instead, his reliance upon published opinions
forces him to use the writings of other Justices and to conclude,
inexactly, that "Justice Murphy's stress was on the 'freedom of re"8
ligion,' clause and not so much on the 'establishment clause.'
Finally, the inevitable unevenness of the method is accentuated
by including in the introductory chapters, materials about more
recent civil liberties issues, such as loyalty programs, which have
little relation to Murphy as a jurist. Apparently, the book is intended to serve as a kind of civil liberties reader with Justice MurPhy's opinions as a springboard to contemporary issues. For the
reader, however, it lacks the scope and fluency of the Emerson and
Haber collection; 9 and the causal links between Justice Murphy
and current issues are insufficiently drawn.
The conceptual weakness is aggravated by deficiencies in editing.
The materials not only contain errors, but present Murphy as a
libertarian purist without mentioning "the other Murphy," which
made him such an enigmatic and interesting character. The reader
C

330 U.S. 1 (1947).
McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).

See case materials in

MURPHY,

PAPERS,

on file Michigan Historical Collections,

University of Michigan.
8

NoRRs, op. cit. supra note 1, at 159-75.

"EMERSON &

1958).

HABER, POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES

(2d ed.

BOOK REVIEWS

Vol. 1966: 859]

does not meet the Murphy whose earliest political allies were the
American Legion, William Randolph Hearst, and Father Charles
E. Coughlin. There is no hint of the Attorney General Murphy
who provoked a political storm and a personal clash with Solicitor
General Robert H. Jackson by vigorously prosecuting alleged spies
and alien propagandists in 1939, the Murphy whom cabinet colleagues predicted would be the first New Deal Justice to go conservative, or the "libertarian" who was capable of writing FBI
Chief J. Edgar Hoover after he arrived on the bench: "Unless we
are pudding-headed we will drive from the land the hirelings who
are here to undo the labors of our Fathers."'1 The author quotes
Charles A. Beard's tribute to Murphy's civil liberties contributions
as a politician, but not Beard's public retraction of same for Murphy's alleged witch hunting in the Detroit Loyalist prosecutions
of 1939.11 In three separate places the author repeats a "damning-byfaint-praise" memorial by Chief Justice Fred M. Vinson, but attributes it to Chief Justice Harlan F. Stone-who had been dead for
over four years!' 2
In sum, the foregoing criticisms are not meant to imply that the
book lacks positive values. The opinions themselves are a useful
compilation for those without a legal library; and if fairly read, they
should go far toward refuting professional myths that Murphy was
all evangelist and technically incompetent as a lawyer. Libertarians
and Murphy buffs will be glad to see inclusion of a few pre-Court
speeches on libertarian themes, though they might wish for more.
Especially is this so of the addresses on religious toleration directed
to Catholics and Father Coughlin's movement, in which Murphy
rose to great heights as an orator-polemicist.'3 The author's intro1
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ductory essays are solid and workman-like, and the opinions do carry
contagious libertarian conviction. A teacher so inclined might well
fuse these materials into an effective vehicle for civil liberties discussion groups. Of itself, however, the book is incomplete as a
tract and unconvincing as an encomium to Mr. Justice Murphy.
WOODFORD HOWARD*
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